An experiment with an incomes policy by Rose McElhattan
Rose McElhattan'::
The growth in output since the beginning of
the recovery in early 1975 has matched that of
previous upturns, but unemployment and infla-
tion remain abnormally high. The twin prob-
lems of high unemployment and inflation may
remain with us for several years; forecasts are
remarkably similar on that point, with the job-
less rate between 6 and 7 percent and the infla-
tion rate around 5 to 6 percent in 1980.' The
persistence of these twin problems helps explain
why incomes policies are again receiving con-
sideration by the press, economists and policy
makers.
The term "incomes policy" refers to a wide
range of government measures which supple-
ment the traditional instruments of fiscal and
monetary policy and which are designed to im-
prove the tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation. An incomes policy can incorporate
direct government controls to hold down prices
and freeze wages, as well as milder policies such
as "jawboning." It can also include measures
that would tend to promote competition in labor
and products markets in order to keep prices
down, such as more vigorous antitrust action.
In general, incomes policies are de.signed to
bring about a lower level of prices than would
otherwise exist at a given level of unemploy-
ment. They are aimed at affecting prices through
the supply side, such as by constraining costs of
production or decreasing monopoly power.
European experiences with incomes policies
in the post-World War II period mostly have
involved a wages guideline, with wage increases
"'Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The
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tied to increases in output per manhour.~ This
paper applies an approach of that type to the
U.S. economy. We consider the impact upon
U.S. aggregate economic activity of an incomes
policy which sets the average increase in wages
equal to the trend rate of growth in labor pro-
ductivity. The economic impact is estimated
through simulations of the U.S. economy with a
version of the MPS model (Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology/University of Pennsyl-
vania/Social Science Research Council) over
the 1967-1971 period. The policy analyzed
here differs from the policies actually adopted
in the 1971-73 period because it is concerned
only with the rate of growth of wages. One ad-
vantage of such an approach, as we will discuss
later, is that by controlling prices indirectly
through wages, we can avoid direct cumbersome
controls on final prices. We have analyzed the
1967-7I period because we lacked sufficient
data to analyze the period of the late 1970's,
and because that earlier period produced unem-
ployment and inflation problems that our con-
ventional tools of monetary and fiscal policy did
not-or could not-solve.
The period beginning in 1967 was one of
phenomenal increases in unit labor costs and
soaring prices. Arthur Okun has suggested that
we had a "second chance" in mid-1967 to stem
the inflationary climb, which would have been
successful if we had taken advantage of tradi-
tional fiscal and monetary policy tools." But
studies of that period, using a variety of mone-
tary- and fiscal-policy mixes, indicate that we
could not have avoided a substantial rise in in-
nation in late 1968 without suffering a high costin terms of lost jobs and output.4 The present
study is designed to determine what impact an
incomes policy would have had in the 1967-71
period. We do not consider the difficult problem
of policy administration, and during the model
simulations of proposed wage constraints, we
have made a number of assumptions which sig-
nificantly affect the final results. We ask the
following question:
What is the result of imposing restraints
solely on wages with respect to major eco-
nomic measures such as unemployment,
prices, real income and income shares?
This article describes an experiment in in-
comes policy. Itis called an experiment because
the results presented cannot be considered a
forecast of what actually would have happened
if such a policy had been implemented. Rather
the paper considers the way in which the in-
comes policy would be analyzed, through the
use of an economic model to determine the pol-
icy's impact on inflation, unemployment and
several other variables. The paper points out
the effects but ignores the costs of an incomes
policy, such as administrative costs or possible
resource misallocation. In summary, our ex-
periment indicates that a wage-directed incomes
policy will have an ambiguous effect on output
and employment, depending on the assump-
tions made, and that the labor share of income
will be less than otherwise would have been the
case. The major benefit of the incomes policy
would be a temporarily lower rate of inflation.
How long this would last cannot be determined
in the model. The paper does not consider the
possibility of supplementing the incomes policy
with monetary or fiscal measures, but attempts
to retain historical monetary and fiscal policies.
The next section of this paper describes the
price equation in the MPS model. This is fol-
lowed by the simulation results of a wage-con-
trol policy, and then by a discussion of the
meaning and applicability of the econometric
results.
Inflation and the Price Equation in the MPS
Model
Incomes policies are essentially efforts to re-
duce the rate of inflation at a given level of un-
employment. Policy measures which associate
wage and productivity increases are designed to
control the rise in unit labor costs, the predom-
inant price-raising factor in the short-run in
most large structural economic models.
The price equation used here ignores the role
of money in price determination, which may
appear at odds with monetary explanations of
inflation. If inflation is fundamentally a mone-
tary phenomenon, why is the money supply ex-
cluded from the direct determination of prices?
The answer is that the price equation is em-
bedded in a larger model in which prices and
money are indeed tied together in the determina-
tion of income, output and employment. The
channels in the MPS model through which
changes in money affect prices and output have
been discussed in detail elsewhere. 5 In brief, a
change in the rate of growth of the money sup-
ply will have only transitory effects on real-
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sector variables such as employment and real
output. In the longer run, the model has very
classical properties, with real output being left
unaffected by the change in the money stock,
and with the rate of inflation being determined
entirely within the monetary sector. In the
shorter run, however, an acceleration in the rate
of money growth initiallystimulates the demand
for goods and services as well as for the labor
to meet that demand. The additional pressures
in labor and other factor markets affect wages
and other costs of production; in this sense,
changes in business costs are the proximate but
not the fundamental cause of inflation.
The price equation in the MPS model, as in
most large scale econometric models, is a cost
mark-up equation. It has been shown by Nord-
haus that pricing behavior for a profit-maximi-
zing firm results in an optimal price (net of
indirect taxes) based on factor costs. These
costs include the prices of capital services,
labor, raw materials and a trend component toChart 1
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P = Price deflator for nonfarm domestic
business product
W = Employee compensation per manhour
in nonfarm domesticbusiness
Q = Output per manhour
k = Mark-Up factor
W/Q = Unit laborcosts
Price determination in the form of equation
(1) means that if business profit margins (k)
remain constant, then price changes will be
strictly labor-cost determined. In this simplest
representation, a rise in unit labor costs (W/Q)
will be matched by a proportionate rise in
prices. Thus the rate of price inflation is deter-
mined solely by the "pass-through" of labor-
cost increases into prices.
Equation (1 ) is an oversimplified version of
the MPS pricing equation.' Four major adjust-
ments convert it into a form suitable for short-
run price estimation in the MPS model. First,
the mark-up is assumed to vary with demand
pressure. Second, terms in current productivity
capture the advance of productivity through
time. The level ofprices can then be determined
by the level of these costs, a term representing
productivity, and a scale factor, which repre-
sents the mark-up fraction."
Numerous econometric efforts to find the im-
pact of the price of capital services have been
unsuccessful, so that this cost is generally as-
sumed to be estimated in the constant term of
the price equation. In addition, the price index
which is estimated by the basic behavioral price
equation is the deflator for nonfarm domestic
business product. Also, it is a value-added con-
cept, which means that the cost of raw materials
to the nonfarm business sector does not enter
directly in the determination of the price index.
Raw-materials inputs to the business sector con-
sist mainly of farm products and imports, so
that any increase (say) in their prices will raise
prices in the aggregate nonfarm business sector
with a delay, as each price increase is passed on
to final consumers. With these considerations
in mind, we can represent the basic price equa-
tion as follows:
P= k·W/Q (1)
33~ 01258 In( 31.91 PWf1 + 68.09 PFM ) + .00011 JS4
(~.53) 31.91 PWM~I + 68.09 PFM~I (.09)
The most notable features of this equation
are the following:
(1) The lag structure of wages means that
any wage change is almost entirely passed
through to prices in a little over two years. A
one-percent increase in wages will result in .75
percentage-point increase in the rate of infla-
tion within one year and about .95 percentage-
point increase by the end of two years.')
(2) The trend rate of growth in productivity
results in a steady decline in prices each year of
where
P = Price deflator for nonfarm domestic
business product
W = Employee compensation rate in non-
farm domestic business
OUPD = Unfilled orders for producers dur-
abIes
EPD Expenditures on producers durables
XBNF = Nonfarm domestic business product
andproduce of households
LMHT Manhours in nonfarm domestic busi-
ness sector, includingproprietors
PWM = Raw materials prices, imports
PFM Raw materials prices, farm
JS2 Seasonal dummy variable for the sec-
ond quarter
JS3 = Seasonal dummy variable for the
third quarter
JS4 Seasonal dummy variable for the
fourth quarter
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and trend productivity are included. Third, the
rates of change of farm and import prices are
added to capture initial adjustment effects.
Lastly, prices are assumed to adjust with a lag
to cost and mark-up changes.
It is assumed that the mark-up fraction (k)
depends upon the level of excess demand. Firms
which possess some short-run monopoly power
might raise their mark-up margins to a high level
during a boom and shade their prices when de-
mand weakens. Demand pressures are repre-
sented by the ratio of unfilled orders (OUPD)
to shipments of producers' durable equipment
(EPD), specifically:
k=bJ+b"(OUPD/EPD)t-b)(OUPD/EPD)t~l
The negative coefficient (bJ implies a rate-of-
change variable which is intended to capture the
effect on the mark-up of expectations of demand
change.'
Secondly, it is assumed that firms base their
estimate of the rate of technical change both on
long trends and on more recent movements of
average labor productivity. The value (Q) is
replaced with two terms: a term representing
current productivity (measured as an eight-
quarter average to remove some of its cyclical
movement) and a time variable to capture long-
run trend movement. Thirdly, since the price
index is a value added-deflator for the nonfarm
domestic-business sector, the index will initially
decline when farm or import prices rise if these
costs are not immediately passed on to final
consumers. In order to capture this temporary
effect, a fixed-weight average of farm and im-
ported-materials prices was added to the equa-
tion. Its coefficient should be negative. Finally,
it is assumed that cost and mark-up factors in-
fluence prices with a distributed lag through
time. To incorporate lagged adjustment, the
price index was included with a one-period de-
lay on the right-hand side of the estimated
equation.
Equation (1) was estimated with these four
modifications, subject to the constraint that the
long-run elasticity of prices to wages be unity.
The result was as follows (numbers in paren-
thesis are t values) :
34about .60 percentage points, while a one-per- control of wage-rate increases can successfully
cent increase in the sum of current and lagged control domestic nonfarm prices, without di-
estimates of productivity leads to an additional rectly controlling the latter. Incomes policies
decline of about .36 percentage points. which fundamentally rely on wage restraints
(3) Prices respond positively to demand have an important advantage in that they obvi-
pressures, even when unit labor costs are held ate the need to create a cumbersome adminis-
constant. This is demonstrated by the esti- trative apparatus to control final prices. Inter-
mated coefficients of unfilled orders to ship- esting examples of two such policies are the
ments. On average, during post-Korean War tax-based incomes policy advocated by Henry
cycles, the demand effect is estimated to have C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub,11 and an in-
raised the rate of inflation between trough and comes policy recently updated by Vijaya G.
peak quarters about 2.5 percentage points, Duggal and Lawrence R. Klein.'"
assuming no changes in the other price deter- The importance of the term representing de-
minants in equation (2). This result is con- mand pressures illustrates the potential signifi-
sistent with Gordon's recent work on the im- cance of monetary- and fiscal-policy effects
pact of excess demand on prices, which suggests upon prices. An increase in aggregate demand
that on the average, demand pressures have which is initiated, say, by expansive monetary
added about 2.8 percentage points (trough to and fiscal polices can act to increase demand
peak) to the inflation rate during post-World pressures and thereby prices. An incomes pol-
War II business cycles. 1() icy which holds down unit.labor costs will not
The pricing behavior estimated by equation be able under such circumstances to stop the
(2) has major significance for stabilization pol- inflationary rise due to demand-pull pressures,
icy. It suggests that an incomes policy which and wili not survive when monetary and fiscal
can restrain the rise in unit labor costs through stimulus becomes excessive.
Charl 2
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with Wage-Control Model Simulations
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1971 1967 1969 1971Controlling Unit Labor Costs Through an
Incomes Policy-ASimulation Experiment
Hourly Wage Rates in Nonfarm Private
Domestic Business
Annual Rate of Increase, 1967-1 . 1971.2
inal wage rates, which is equalto the long-term
growth rate in output per manhour. The his-
torical and assumed wage rates are shown be-
low.
Assumed Value in
Historical Value Wage Control Alternatives
From this discussion of the direct determi-
nants of prices, we can conclude that a change
in wages equal to the change in productivity
will result in unchanged prices after a two-year
adjustment period, assuming no change in ex-
cess demand. If prices are held down by an
incomes policy, a given amount of aggregate
demand should, at least in the short run, result
in greater real output and employment, since
part of the demand does not become dissipated
in higher prices. On the other hand, because
of adjustment lags between wages and prices,
holding down wages may initially hold down
real income and could adversely affect employ-
ment. To determine the impact of wage con-
trols upon economic activity, we turn to simula-
tion experiments with the MPS model over the
period from 1967.2 to 1971.2.
These experiments may be identified as Wage
Control-Alternative I, and Wage Control-Al-
ternative 2. One common element is present
in both experiments-the assumption of a con-
stant 3-percent annual rate of increase in nom-
Chart 3




























































The difference between the actual historical
value and a wage-simulation result is a mea-
sure of the impact of controlling the increase in
wages.'3 But, if this difference is to reflect
accurately the impact of wage controls, it is
necessary that the structure of the MPS model
allow all significant reactions to the wage
change to take place. In several ways, the MPS
model is not structured to capture the economic
response to the wage changes we have made.
We have attempted to adjust the model for
some of its structural shortcomings, and we
acknowledge that the adjustments, which are
our "best guesses," are somewhat arbitrary. It
is for this reason that we present two wage-
control alternatives and detail the judgmental
changes imposed upon the results.In Wage-Control-Alternative I, we not only
assume a constant 3-percent average wage in-
crease, but also adjust the cost of capital for
producers durables to reflect the expected drop
in inflation rates due to this 3-percent wage
constraint.
The cost of capital depends in part upon real
interest costs, which are determined by the dif-
ference between a nominal long-term interest
rate and the expected rate of inflation. The
expected inflation rate is estimated by a dis-
tributed lag on past inflation rates. In the wage-
control simulation, the mechanical application
of the distributed lag on past rates of inflation
results in a very low expected inflation rate,
and hence a very high real rate of interest and
cost of capital. The high cost of capital worked
in our initial simulations to reduce investment
substantially in business durable equipment, so
we then adjusted the cost-of-capital term so
that it would not go above the rates experi-
enced in the first half of the 1960's, when prices
and interest rates were similar to their simu-
lated valuesY
Business expectations of future prices are an
important determinant of investment plans and
expenditures. Undoubtedly, an incomes policy
can influence these expectations to a major ex-
tent. Our assumption regarding price expecta-
tions, and hence the cost of capital, implies that
the business community believes the incomes
policy will be successful in holding down unit
labor costs through its constraints on wage-rate
increases. If the business community believes
otherwise, any number of alternative possibili-
ties could emerge. For example, if business
felt that controls would lead to bottlenecks in
certain raw-materials areas, a sizable increase
in demand could take place, creating price
pressures which otherwise would not exist.
Our price expectations assumption also im-
plies that market participants build their infla-
tion expectations on more information about
the effects of wage controls on prices than sim-
ply extrapolating past price changes into the
future.'5
Wage Control-Alternative 1 results in an im-
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provement over historical values for real out-
put, employment and prices (Table 1). Real
output increases steadily and by 1970, GNP is
$19.7 billion greater than historical estimates.
The unemployment rate declines in response to
the greater growth in real output and remains
below 4.0 percent over the 1967-70 period; by
1970 it is 3.7 percent, compared with the 5.0-
percent historical value. The rate of inflation
responds to the drop in wages, falling in 1967
to 2.6 percent from its historical rate of 3.2
percent, and remaining below 2.0 percent over
the following three years. By 1970, the infla-
tion rate is 1.7 percent, compared with the his-
torical rate of 5.5 percent.
Real disposable income per member of the
labor force declines relative to historical values
for the first two years of the simulation, but
then increases substantially, reaching $6,231 in
1970, or $151 greater than its historical value.
The changes in this measure mostly reflect the
time required in the model for prices to adjust
fully to changes in wages. Because of this de-
layed reaction, the real purchasing power of
wage income will initially fall while profits,
calculated residually, will show improvement.
We may therefore expect some drop in labor
income (relative to its historical value), as
prices adjust slowly to the lower rate of wage
growth. In fact, labor income does not increase
relative to historical values until 1970, the last
year of the simulation. The earlier increase in
real disposable income represents an increase
in the purchasing power of non-labor com-
ponents: property and proprietor income, and
transfer payments. Alternative I thus suggests
that labor income may not show any marked
increase (relative to historical values) when an
incomes policy is initially instituted.'G In Table
2, we show the effect of Alternative I upon real
GNP and its components, along with the differ-
ences between these results and historical
values. The decline shown here in personal
consumption is related to the drop in real dis-
posable income in the initial periods of the
simulation. The relative decline in business
fixed investment reflects the higher real interest(7) Relative Income Shares of Corporate Profits (Percent)t
16.8% 17.5% .7% 17.5
16.3 18.4 2.1 18.0
14.1 15.8 1.7 14.7
11.4 15.0 3.6 13.3
(6) Real Corporate Profits and I.V.A. ($ Billions)**
$ 68.1 $ 70.4 $ 2.3 $ 70.3
70.0 77.6 7.6 75.6
63.3 70.5 7.2 64.7







































































Historical Values and Wage Control Alternatives
for Selected Economic Variables, 1967·70
Wage Control Change from Wage Control
Alternative 1 Historical Value Alternative 2

















(4) Real Disposable Income Per Member ofthe Labor Force
$5,849 $5,828 $ -21 $5,824
5,983 5,962 -21 5,937
5,984 6,043 59 5,981
6,080 6,231 151 6,145















































'Employee compensation deflated by consumer price index.
"Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment deflated by consumer price index.




Profits Relative Income Share*
the model, are adjusted to change only in re-
sponse to changes in real income.
Both Federal grants-in-aid to state-and-Iocal
governments and Federal transfers to persons
(other than unemployment-insurance benefits)
are exogenous variables in the model. The
amount of these expenditures is, in some way,
affected by current prices, and allocations could
decline somewhat in the wage-control situation
as a result of the significantly lower prices.
Consequently, we adjusted the amounts of
these two variables so that real expenditures
equaled their historical real magnitudes. In
Alternative 2, our adjustment implies that fed-
eral fiscal policy is determined in real rather
than current dollar magnitudes, which is the
reverse of the assumption under Alternative I.
With Federal grants reduced, Alternative 2
shows smaller values than Alternative 1 for
state - and - local government expenditures,
amounting to about $1 billion in 1969 and $2
billion in 1970 (Tables 2 and 3). Restricting
Federal transfers to their historical real-dollar
magnitudes results in relatively smaller real dis-
posable income and hence relatively smaller
consumption expenditures. In Alternative 2,
real transfers to persons (other than unemploy-
ment insurance) are reduced by $1.3 billion in
1968, $2.9 billion in 1969 and $5.2 billion in
1970.
Export and import prices, as well as export
volume, are exogenous variables in the model,
while import volume is assumed to respond to
relative prices and real income. Consequently,
the decline in U.S. prices associated with an
incomes policy should lead to substantial in-
creases in net exports, since current-dollar ex-
ports remain at their historical levels and im-
ports decline dramatically as U.S. prices fall
relative to fixed foreign prices. But because of
uncertainty regarding the world response to a
decline in U.S. prices, we assumed that the in-
comes policy would be relatively neutral in its
impact upon net exports, with no price effects
on the quantities of internationally traded
goods. Thus, there would be no gain in the
U.S. foreign trade balance from the price ad- 1971
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divided by employee compensation
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rate in the wage-control run as compared to its
historical estimate. Nominal interest rates in
the wage-control simulation do not decline as
rapidly as prices, because price changes take
some time-through adjustment delays in the
model-to alter other economic and financial
variables.
A substantial amount of the change in real
GNP in this wage-control simulation is due to
increases in real net exports and government
expenditures. These factors may partly reflect
some shortcomings in the basic model, for
which adjustments are made in our second
simulation.
Wage Control-Alternative 2 includes several
of the same assumptions underlying the first
alternative. We assume as before a constant
3-percent annualincreasein nominal wages, and
we continue the same adjustment to the cost of
capital for producers' durable goods. But we
also make two further adjustments. First, cer-
tain fiscal variables which are exogenous and
fixed in current dollars are changed to reflect
the lower prices generated by the incomes pol-
icy. Second, real exports, which are exogenous
and thus not determined by the model, are kept
at their historical values, while real imports,
which are estimated by behavioral equations in
39TABLE 2
Real GNP and Components-HistoricalValues and Values
Under Wage Control-Alternative 1
(Billions of 1958dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Historical Values
Gross National Product .
Personal Consumption Expenditures .
Business Fixed Investment .
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4.7vantage which could occur due to relatively
lower domestic prices and the time delay in-
volved in exchange-rate adjustments. Because
of this assumption, net exports in Alternative 2
are close to historical values.
As a result of these adjustments, real GNP
generally remains below historical values
throughout the simulation, and the unemploy-
ment rate is higher than historical values from
1968 until 1971. (Table 1.) The inflation rate,
on the other hand, remains substantially lower
than historical rates; for example, it is 1.8 per-
cent in 1970 compared with the actual 5.5-
percent rate.
These results suggest that a wage-control
policy may be successful in controlling the rate
of inflation. But while reducing inflation, the
growth in real incomes may be insufficient to
maintain employment at historical levels during
much of the period of controls.
Evaluation ofthe Incomes Policy Simulations
Our analysis has focused upon the conse-
quences of a change from historical experience
in average hourly wages. The findings are de-
pendent upon the behavioral structure of the
MPS model as well as the assumptions we have
imposed along the way. If the model results
are to have any applicability, they should be
carefully interpreted within that context. To
round-out our analysis, we should also consider
the consequences of alternative assumptions, as
well as other factors which could modify our
conclusions.
Sensitivity to Alternative Assumptions
The model results suggest that a program
which controls wage-rate increases can, for a
time, control the rate of increase in final prices
without direct price intervention. The impact
of wage controls upon real output and employ-
ment, however, remains uncertain. Under
equally feasible alternative assumptions, the
impact of wage controls upon output and em-
ployment can differ considerably.
In Alternative 1, we assumed that Federal
grants-in-aid and transfer payments were deter-
mined in terms of nominal dollars. Under this
assumption, we obtained a sizable boost in
such expenditures in terms of the real goods
and services they commanded, because prices
were considerably lower than in the real-life
situation. Again, we assumed that a price ad-
vantage would occur in the U.S. relative to
foreign-priced products, and this resulted in a
41
sizable increase in net exports and thus a large
stimulus to domestic activity. In the final anal-
ysis, Wage Control-Alternative 1 resulted in
lower inflation than we actually experienced
over the 1967-70 period, as well as a lower
unemployment rate and a higher level of in-
come.
In Alternative 2, by contrast, we assumed
that Federal policy with regard to grants and
transfers was determined in real terms rather
than nominal. We adjusted the model so that
these expenditures equalled their historical
real-dollar magnitudes, and, in doing so re-
moved a good deal of economic stimulus. We
also assumed that the incomes policy would be
relatively neutral in its impact upon net exports,
so that internationally-traded goods would not
be affected by price changes brought on by the
wage policy. This assumption kept net exports
in Alternative 2 close to historical values. As a
result, prices were kept lower, but unemploy-
ment rose and real income and output declined
relative to their historical values.
Linkage Between Money and Price Changes
In the MPS model of the U.S. economy, the
percentage change in prices over the long-run
tends to equal the percentage change in the
money supply. Price reactions to changes in
money begin with changes in interest rates, and
these lead to changes in the cost of capital and
in the demand for real output. Changes in
demand for final products lead to changes inTABLE 3
Real GNP and Components-Historical Values and Values
Under Wage Control-Alternative 2
(Billions of 1958dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Historical Values
Gross National Product .
Personal Consumption Expenditures .
Business Fixed Investment .
Residential Structures. . . . . . . . .. . .
Inventory Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Net Exports .
Exports .
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Government Purchases .
Federal .
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2.6labor demand, and these bring about changes
in wages which in turn become the major deter-
minant of prices. The imposition of controls
on wage increases thwarts the major channel by
which monetary changes lead to price changes.
The blockage of this channel, however, will not
eliminate the pressures upon prices precipitated
by the initial change in the money supply. If
an incomes policy is to have any long-run suc-
cess in keeping prices down, long-run monetary
growth rates must be consistent with the price
objectives of the incomes policy. In our simu-
lations, the historical M, money supply grew at
a 5.5-percent average annual rate over the
1967-70 period. This rate is too high to sup-
port for very long the zero or one-percent rate
of inflation implied by our wage-growth as-
sumption.
Policy Implementation and Resource
Allocation
We have not touched upon the difficult prob-
lem of implementing the intended incomes pol-
icy, because our econometric model simply
assumes that the intended policy is successful.
The important point to bear in mind is that the
average wage is not a policy variable which can
be manipulated by policy-makers, being unlike
tax rates, federal expenditures, or discount
rates in this respect. To achieve a desired
growth in the average wage rate, policy-makers
must exert some control over individual sector
or industry wages and, unavoidably, their ac-
tions in doing so will change the relative price
structure which would otherwise exist. Such
interference in the marketplace can ~istort the
operation of the pricing system which, even in
markets characterized by large power groups,
has proved to be a relatively efficient means of
allocating resources in a complex society.
Implementation of an incomes policy appar-
ently will have to be flexible enough to consider
individual cases, in order to allow markets to
allocate resources freely. Policy-makers in this
situation try to insure that the average wage
level does not drift upward, while allowing
43
movement in the structure of wages to guide
resources efficiently. Although this intention is
clear in principle, its implementation presents
a formidable task and constitutes one of the
greatest problems facing incomes policy.
The results of our model simulations depend
upon the policy-maker's success in dealing with
problems of implementation, which have been
recognized by supporters of wage guidelines,
such as Sidney Weintraub and Robert Solow:
A proper policy would maintain the aver-
age wage movement within the average
improvement norm. Simultaneously it
would seek to achieve a strong measure of
equity between wage earners of similar
skills. It must also aim to direct labor
into industries, occupation, and geograph-
ical areas of most urgent need. . .. Policy
implementation is difficult though the gen-
eral principles are less recondite.'T
The guideposts are intended to have an
effect on the general level of money wages
and prices, not on relative wages and rela-
tive prices. Most of the things we expect
free markets to accomplish are real things,
more or less independent of the price
level. Ideally, the guideposts should per-
mit markets to allocate resources freely,
insuring only that the price level does not
drift up in the process. . . . In practice,
the guideposts will operate unevenly; rela-
tive prices and resource allocation may
thus be affected. . . . One can hope that
the uneven effects of guideposts will be of
second order. . .. This inevitable uneven-
ness in operation strikes me as the main
weakness in the guideposts.'"
Income Distribution: Profits and Wages
Our experience with incomes policies sug~
gests that it will be impossible to maintain any
form of wage and/or price programs unless the
policy is generally regarded as equitable.'" As
we indicated, the real purchasing power of
labor income is likely to fall relative to profitswhen a wage-restraint policy is initiated. This
unequal burden may stand in the way of suc-
cessful policy implementation.cO
Again, we have assumed restraints only on
wages, largely because it seemed realistic to
accept the faUing-profits trend which actually
occurred between 1967 and 1970. But in doing
so, we have implicitly assumed that the result-
ing income distribution was acceptable to both
labor and profit recipients, and to the extent
that it is not true, the policy has little chance of
success.
Summary and Conclusions
We have tried to answer the question: What
impact would an incomes policy have upon
U.S. economic activity? Our simulated incomes
policy involved restricting the growth of the
average wage rate in domestic nonfarm busi-
ness to 3 percent a year, equal to the trend rate
of growth in output per manhour in that sector
since the late 1930's. We analyzed the impact
of this policy on the U.S. economy from
1967.2 - 1971.2, employing simulation tech-
niques in a version of the MPS model.
We presented results of the proposed wage-
control program under two alternative sets of
assumptions. The results generally suggest that
a program which controls wage-rate increases
can for a time control the rate of increase in
domestic nonfarm prices without any direct
intervention in prices. However, a wage-control
program can have ambiguous effects on output
and employment. The model results are sensi-
tive to assumptions regarding the foreign sec-
tor's reaction to lower U.S. inflation, and re-
gardingfiscal policy's impact on allocating funds
(in either real or nominal terms).
Both alternative wage-control simulations
suggest that labor's real income may decline
relative to its historical value for some time
after the institution of an incomes policy which
restricts wage growth. In addition, labor's share
of total income is likely to fall relative to the
share of total income going to corporate profits.
Under both simulations, however, business
plant-equipment expenditures were somewhat
less than their historical values, because nom-
inal interest rates did not fall as rapidly as final
prices while the real cost of capital remained
higher than its historical cost. Finally, we
should emphasize that we maintained the his··
torical money growth and federal tax rates in
our simulations, so that the results would re-
flect only the impact of keeping wage growth
within the limits set by the long-run productiv-
ity trend.
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